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Consumer Welfare In Competition And Intellectual Property Law
BY HER BERT HOVENK A MP1
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of “general welfare” or “consumer welfare” has been debated for decades. !e academic debate is much more varied than the case law, however, which has consistently adopted consumer welfare as a goal.
 While some practices such as mergers might produce greater gains in productive e#ciency than losses in 
consumer welfare, identifying such situations would be extraordinarily di#cult. First, these e#ciencies would 
have to be “transaction speci$c,” meaning that they could not be attained by other means. Second, these would 
necessarily be gains that accrue at lower output levels than previous to the practice; otherwise there would be 
no consumer harm to balance. But most e#ciency gains accrue at higher rather than lower output levels. !ird, 
collusion facilitating practices spread welfare losses across an entire industry, while production gains typically 
accrue only to the participants in a merger or similar practice. Fourth, the reigning tradeo% models generally 
assume a market that was competitive prior to the practice and monopolized after. Most practices that facili-
tate the exercise of market power occur in markets that were noncompetitive to begin with. In these situations 
consumer losses are relatively larger and producer gains smaller.  
Relatively little has been written about consumer welfare and intellectual property law. A well functioning 
IP system would increase consumer welfare in both the short and long run, so no tradeo% would be needed. 
In the imperfect system that we have, however, consumer losses do occur, mainly when IP rights are excessive 
in relation to innovation incentives, or when the rights are given to things that would have been developed (or 
have already been developed) anyway by ordinary market processes.
Both competition law and intellectual law are 
concerned with promoting economic welfare. Two 
fundamental questions for both are determining how 
welfare should be de$ned, and how these welfare goals 
should be implemented. Producer welfare rises as the 
amount producers receive exceeds the lowest amount 
they are willing to accept, which is generally their cost. 
Consumer welfare rises with the di%erence between the 
amount consumers must pay and the amount they are 
willing to pay. When we speak of economic welfare we 
ordinarily mean the sum of these two di%erences, or total “surplus.” A perfectly competitive economy is said 
to be e#cient because it maximizes the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus. In addition, competition 
drives selling prices toward marginal cost, and purchasing prices to the marginal consumer’s willingness to pay, 
assuming there is no price discrimination.
Innovation complicates this model by incorporating incentives over the long run. Firms want to break out 
of competitive returns by doing something di%erent, whether developing a new product or process, or simply 
BOTH COMPETITION LAW AND 
INTELLECTUAL LAW ARE CONCERNED 
WITH PROMOTING ECONOMIC WELFARE. 
TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 
FOR BOTH ARE DETERMINING HOW 
WELFARE SHOULD BE DEFINED, 
AND HOW THESE WELFARE GOALS 
SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.
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di!erentiating their product o!ering from someone else’s. Over the long run innovation contributes a great deal 
to economic growth, much more than the general movement of markets from lesser to greater price competi-
tion.2  Private innovation is costly, however, and requires an inducement. "e principal inducement the legal 
system provides is exclusive rights that facilitate short-run returns above competitive levels. "e Patent and 
Copyright Act’s temporary periods of exclusivity create exclusive rights that diminish competitive pressures and 
yield supracompetitive returns for successful inventions.
An ideal innovation policy would facilitate the optimal amount of innovation. Privately, this occurs when 
the amount of increasing investment in innovation just equals the incremental return.3 In order to be socially 
optimal, the returns must also net out the social value of the innovation and the ine#ciency, or deadweight loss, 
that results from any exclusive rights that IP protection provides. A precisely tailored policy must determine the 
optimal duration and scope of intellectual property rights that would produce this result. For example, a right 
that simply forbids copying, such as copyright and trade secret law convey, is much narrower than a right that 
condemns all duplication, whether or not the infringer copied or even knew about the right, such as patent law 
conveys. A patent that lasts 100 years might provide a greater incentive to innovate in some markets, but the 
longer period would also yield greater deadweight loss by postponing competition.
Identifying and achieving the optimal social level of innovation would be heroic. Ex post, one can often 
conclude that a certain investment in innovation was or was not cost justi$ed. Ex ante, however, successful in-
novation is dominated by the unexpected. Over time, the managers of innovative $rms may acquire considerable 
experience in distinguishing worthwhile from less promising research investments, but the level of uncertainty 
is almost always higher than when we are considering ongoing production of unchanging products sold in 
established markets. Further, while the costs of innovation are speci$c to the industry and the project, the legal 
system meters returns by providing largely one-size-$ts-all regulation of the duration and scope of IP rights. 
For example, a patent lasts twenty years from the application date, with some adjustments. "is applies in both 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, where products can have a commercial life of many decades, and 
also in electronic communications and computers, where technologies often become obsolete in a few years. 
"e transaction costs of operating a system that took 
individual market di!erences into account would be 
very high. Further, we have extraordinarily poor in-
formation about such basic questions as the optimal 
duration and scope of a patent or copyright. Further, 
in at least some situations the optimal amount is zero.4
Competition policy is also concerned with maxi-
mizing welfare. A signi$cant debate has developed over 
whether “general welfare” or “consumer welfare” should 
be the goal of the antitrust laws. General welfare looks 
at the sum of consumers’ plus producers’ surplus, while consumer welfare looks only at the former. Economists 
who write about competition policy almost always speak about general welfare. "is includes both the Har-
vard and Chicago Schools, the two groups that have dominated antitrust economics over nearly a century. "e 
debate among antitrust writers is more balanced, with many advocating consumer welfare as antitrust’s goal.5
"e debate o!ers a degree of richness and complexity that is completely belied by the case law, however. 
IDENTIFYING AND ACHIEVING 
THE OPTIMAL SOCIAL LEVEL OF 
INNOVATION WOULD BE HEROIC. EX 
POST, ONE CAN OFTEN CONCLUDE 
THAT A CERTAIN INVESTMENT IN 
INNOVATION WAS OR WAS NOT COST 
JUSTIFIED. EX ANTE, HOWEVER, 
SUCCESSFUL INNOVATION IS 
DOMINATED BY THE UNEXPECTED.
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With virtually no exceptions, the courts take a consumer welfare approach to antitrust and competition law. A 
recent example is the Supreme Court’s divided Actavis decision on pay-for-delay settlements in pharmaceutical 
drug patent cases. !e "ve-member majority evaluated the issue entirely from a consumer welfare perspective. 
But even the three dissenters acknowledged that “the point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets 
to promote consumer welfare.”6
To be sure, producer welfare (surplus) is relevant to background policy decisions, such as why we have a 
rule of reason and when we apply it. But when it comes to speci"cs the courts uniformly apply a consumer 
welfare approach.
!is is not to say that producer gains are taken lightly. On the contrary, they are accorded great weight, 
but principally because they lead to consumer gains. For example, the market power/structure screen used for 
rule of reason and merger analysis assumes that consumers can only gain from e#ciencies that "rms without 
market power attain.7  If 10 Italian restaurants in Manhattan decide to grow tomatoes collectively, competi-
tive harm in the market for either tomatoes or Italian restaurant prices is unlikely. !is joint venture will be 
pro"table only if it makes cheaper or better tomatoes, and consumers can only bene"t. !e same thing would 
be true if any two of those restaurants should merge. In general, e#ciencies from joint activities in competitive 
markets bene"t consumers, but they also bene"t producers by giving them advantages over rivals who have not 
yet duplicated the e#cient technology or organization. At the other extreme, naked collusion bene"ts producers 
and harms consumers, and antitrust condemns it.8
Complexities occur in antitrust e#ciency analysis when a practice simultaneously produces e#ciency gains 
and leads to reduced competition, such as some mergers or joint ventures where the participants have signi"cant 
market power. In general, these situations can be divided into two kinds. First are situations where the "rms 
involved in the challenged activity have or threaten to have serious market power, but the activity produces 
e#ciencies so signi"cant that they fully o$set any likely power e$ects. Prices are lower, or at least no higher, 
than they had been previously. A good example in the joint venture context is the Supreme Court’s Broadcast 
Music (BMI’s) decision, which involved copyright blanket license agreements that included virtually every piece 
of commercially recorded music. !e scope of the arrangement created an inference of power, but it was largely 
undermined by the fact that individual agreements with copyright holders were all nonexclusive, meaning that 
any one of BMI’s 20,000 artists or ASCAP’s 22,000 members was free to make unlimited sales outside of the 
blanket license agreement. Since cartels can pro"t only by restricting output, achieving that result in this situ-
ation was unthinkable.9 Further, the licensing arrangement, which created the play-on-demand authorization 
that programmers use to this day, was so e#cient that the market as we know it could not exist. So there was 
no balancing of consumer losses against producer gains. Both groups were winners, leaving nothing to balance.
Another example is the merger that both creates monopoly power or facilitates its exercise, and also yields 
production e#ciencies so substantial that the post-merger price (or quality) is better for consumers than the 
pre-merger situation had been. Once again, there is nothing to trade o$. !e merging "rms may have higher 
price/cost margins, pro"ting them, but consumers are better o$ as well. !e merger should be lawful under 
either a general welfare or a consumer welfare test. !is is in fact the test that the Government applies under 
its Merger Guidelines. In order to defend a prima facie anticompetitive merger on the basis of e#ciencies the 
proponents must show that the e#ciencies are “merger speci"c”–that is, that they cannot readily be achieved 
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without the merger. !ey must also show that proven e"ciencies are of su"cient magnitude that the market 
price following the merger will be no higher than it had been before.10 In that case there is nothing to trade o#.
!e more di"cult cases occur when a tradeo# is necessary. In the 1960s, Oliver E. Williamson famously 
illustrated that a merger that actually raised prices could nonetheless improve total welfare if the production 
e"ciency gains resulting from the merger were greater than the consumer losses. He also concluded that rela-
tively modest e"ciency gains could achieve this goal.11
 !e $gure shows the result of a merger, joint venture or other practice that both creates monopoly and 
produces gains in productive e"ciency. Prior to the practice the market was competitive. Prices were at P1, 
which is equal to cost C1. !e challenged practice causes two things. First, the $rm’s costs decline to C2. Sec-
ond, however, the $rm acquires a monopoly and no longer prices at cost. Rather it reduces output to Q2 and 
raises price to P2.
Under this model, which Williamson conceded to be highly simpli$ed, consumer prices go up, producing 
a monopoly deadweight loss equal to A1 in the $gure. However, productive e"ciency also goes up, producing 
gains of A2, which in this particular $gure are clearly larger than the A1 losses. So the practice is e"cient in the 
economic sense of increasing total welfare, even though prices are higher. While A3 also represents producer 
gains and consumer losses, it is a “wash” because producers are better o# by the same amount as consumers 
are worse o#.
Williamson’s model has been subjected to a fair amount of criticism. First, if the merger facilitates market 
wide collusion, which is a common rationale for condemning mergers, then the price increases will occur across 
the market, but only the merging $rms will enjoy the production cost savings. !is could change the calculus 
considerably in collusion-facilitating mergers of, say, $ve-to-four players, or four-to-three players.
Second, the analysis assumes that the e"ciencies are strictly “merger speci$c,” which means that only the 
merger that reduces competition can produce them. Often e"ciencies can be attained in less harmful ways, 
including licensing as an alternative to acquisition, or partial spino#s to other sellers.
!ird, the e"ciencies that Williamson’s model illustrates usually have to come from some e#ect other than 
scale economies, because in the tradeo# situation output is actually lower than it had been before. To be sure, 
P2
P1
Q2 Q1
A2
A3
A1
D
C1
C2
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some mergers can enable !rms to take advantage of scale economies even as they reduce output. An example 
might be two !rms that each have an ine"cient 10,000 unit plant. After a merger the !rm might produce 18,000 
units e"ciently out of a single larger plant. Note that the merger itself does not achieve this result, however. It 
simply leaves the !rm with two ine"ciently small plants. None of this is to suggest that there are no e"cien-
cies that can be attained at reduced output; however, the universe of e"ciencies that occur at lower rather than 
higher output may be small, particularly when one adds in the requirement that they must be merger speci!c.
Fourth, some care must be taken to ensure that the cost savings are not merely pecuniary. For example, 
a merger that creates a monopoly on the selling side might also create signi!cant power on the buying side, 
enabling the !rm to suppress the prices that it pays. But in that case any gains to the merging !rm could be 
more than o#set by the losses that accrue to its suppliers, and the case for overall e"ciency evaporates.
Fifth, the Williamson model assumes a market that was perfectly competitive before the challenged practice 
but monopolized afterward. $is would be a rarity. More likely the market prior to the merger or joint venture 
was already noncompetitive, but to a lesser degree. One of the reasons that Williamson’s picture shows a small 
deadweight loss is because at the competitive level the sales are taken from “marginal” consumers who place a 
low value on the product. As a result, loss of these sales entails a fairly low deadweight loss. At higher levels the 
amount of surplus per consumer is much greater, making an output reduction of the same magnitude more 
costly. Further, at these higher levels any e"ciency gains must be spread over a lower output.12
$e second !gure illustrates this idea. It shows the same market as the !rst !gure, and with a merger or 
other practice that produces the same per unit cost reduction. In this case, however, the market was already 
noncompetitive to begin with, re%ecting P1 prices that were higher than cost C1. As a result two things happen. 
First, consumer deadweight loss is larger because output is being taken from consumers whose willingness to 
pay is higher in relation to the product’s cost. Second, because output is already lower to begin with, the e"-
ciency gains resulting from a further output reduction are spread over a smaller number of units. Even though 
the demand curve is identical to the one in the !rst !gure and the per unit amount of the e"ciency gains (the 
height of the rectangle A2) is the same, it is now no longer clear that the area covered by the red !gure is greater 
than the area of deadweight loss de!ned by A1.
 Finally, note that the “tradeo#” model applies to a limited range of situations–namely, where the ef-
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!ciency gain is su"ciently large to o#set the deadweight loss, but not so large that it actually results in a lower 
price than before the merger or joint venture occurred. If the gains were that large there would be no tradeo#; 
both consumers and producers would be better o#. It is di"cult to say what percentage of mergers, joint ven-
tures or other practices lead to both increased market power and a higher price, but o#set production gains 
that exceed consumer losses.
One reason that the consumer welfare principle entirely dominates antitrust analysis is administrability. 
Anytime measurement makes a di#erence–that is, where a practice both facilitates an actual output reduc-
tion resulting from market power but also produces e"ciencies–the fact !nder would have to quantify these 
e#ects and net them out. $at would require a cardinal measurement of deadweight loss and o#setting gains 
in production e"ciency.
Measuring deadweight loss is much di#erent from measuring simple consumer overcharges. Deadweight 
loss is equal to the amount of consumers’ and producers’ surplus that is lost as the result of a monopoly output 
reduction. Computing this requires knowledge about the demand and supply curves in a region where there is 
currently no output. Quantifying e"ciency gains would require the fact !nder to identify merger speci!c gains 
and then compute the value of either cost savings or product or service improvement over the post-practice 
output. I know of no court that has even attempted this in a situation where both numbers are positive and 
signi!cant. Rather, they cite e"ciencies as justifying a practice when no market power is present or it is clear 
that the practice is not reducing output at all. Alternatively, they cite competitive harm in situations where 
market power e#ects indicate an actual output reduction, ignoring e"ciencies. $e approaches taken in these 
two situations are tractable because there is nothing to balance.
Setting aside these administrative di"culties, one 
historical defense of a total welfare approach is that 
producers compete with one another and will com-
pete away any producer gains into consumer gains.13 
Of course, if we have calculated correctly, then the 
market power created by a practice will be su"ciently 
durable that we cannot have con!dence that this will 
happen in the near term. More fundamentally, however, 
there is no reason for giving a preference to producer 
competition over consumer robustness. To the extent 
a practice makes a market bigger there will be more 
demand and more inducement to innovate. A priori, 
increased output and even e"ciency is just as likely 
to “trickle up” from increased consumer demand as 
it is to trickle down from decreased producer supply.
Suppose that we have identi!ed an e"ciency that 
can be attained only by an output-reducing merger. 
What will be the impact of a legal rule that prohibits this merger as long as the output reduction is likely? First, 
the !rms might simply give up their e#orts to attain this particular e"ciency. Second, they might try to !x the 
merger in such as way as to preserve the e"ciency but blunt the competitive harm; as a result, output will be 
ONE REASON THAT THE CONSUMER 
WELFARE PRINCIPLE ENTIRELY 
DOMINATES ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
IS ADMINISTRABILITY. ANYTIME 
MEASUREMENT MAKES A DIFFERENCE%
THAT IS, WHERE A PRACTICE BOTH 
FACILITATES AN ACTUAL OUTPUT 
REDUCTION RESULTING FROM 
MARKET POWER BUT ALSO PRODUCES 
EFFICIENCIES%THE FACT FINDER 
WOULD HAVE TO QUANTIFY THESE 
EFFECTS AND NET THEM OUT. THAT 
WOULD REQUIRE A CARDINAL 
MEASUREMENT OF DEADWEIGHT 
LOSS AND OFFSETTING GAINS 
IN PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY.
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higher than previously, or at least not any lower. !ird, they might try to attain the e"ciency by some other 
means than merger. For example, a large #rm that wants a smaller #rm’s technology might be able to get it with 
a nonexclusive license, which facilitates the e"ciency but without the competitive harm. Fourth, they might 
attempt to increase the magnitude of any e"ciencies so that resulting prices will be no higher than they were 
before, thus eliminating any need for trading o$. Any one of these alternatives would make everyone better o$. 
Given our inability actually to balance consumer harm from output reductions against productive e"ciency 
gains, antitrust’s insistence that a practice do no harm to consumers makes a good deal of sense.
Nevertheless, the importance of Williamson’s con-
clusion remains: a signi#cant set of mergers (or other 
practices, such as joint ventures) could exist in which 
the practice causes an actual market-power-induced 
price increase, but o$setting e"ciencies make overall 
e$ects positive under a general welfare test. !e win-
dow is narrow, however. !e e"ciencies must be large 
enough to o$set deadweight loss, but not so large as to 
o$set the consumer overcharge altogether.
When one looks at actual antitrust policy, the set 
of cases trading o$ actual productive e"ciency gains 
against actual consumer losses is close to empty. Courts 
simply do not #nd, #rst, that a practice actually facili-
tates the exercise of market power and leads to higher 
prices, but second, that the practice should be approved 
because producer gains are bigger than consumer losses. 
Instead, while e"ciency gains are important and often 
even central, the court must be assured that there are 
no consumer losses at all–either because market power 
cannot reasonably be exercised or else because the ef-
#ciency gains are so signi#cant that they fully o$set 
any market power e$ects.
What happens to the consumer welfare principle 
when we think about innovation and intellectual 
property policy? At #rst glance IP law seems di$er-
ent. Courts and other writers often speak of patent and copyright interests as “monopolies.” Inherent in the 
concept of exclusive IP rights is that they provide returns above the competitive level for a period long enough 
that developers can recoup their research and development costs.
If the IP system does what it should be doing, however, consumer loss is not an inherent part of the design. 
New innovation typically competes with existing technology, which largely stays in place. Consumers obtain 
the bene#t of the new products or processes that IP rights make possible, and these should yield a surplus even 
at monopoly prices. 
WHEN ONE LOOKS AT ACTUAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY, THE SET OF CASES 
TRADING OFF ACTUAL PRODUCTIVE 
EFFICIENCY GAINS AGAINST ACTUAL 
CONSUMER LOSSES IS CLOSE TO 
EMPTY. COURTS SIMPLY DO NOT FIND, 
FIRST, THAT A PRACTICE ACTUALLY 
FACILITATES THE EXERCISE OF 
MARKET POWER AND LEADS TO 
HIGHER PRICES, BUT SECOND, THAT 
THE PRACTICE SHOULD BE APPROVED 
BECAUSE PRODUCER GAINS ARE 
BIGGER THAN CONSUMER LOSSES. 
INSTEAD, WHILE EFFICIENCY GAINS 
ARE IMPORTANT AND OFTEN EVEN 
CENTRAL, THE COURT MUST BE 
ASSURED THAT THERE ARE NO 
CONSUMER LOSSES AT ALL%EITHER 
BECAUSE MARKET POWER CANNOT 
REASONABLY BE EXERCISED OR ELSE 
BECAUSE THE EFFICIENCY GAINS ARE 
SO SIGNIFICANT THAT THEY FULLY 
OFFSET ANY MARKET POWER EFFECTS.
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Consider the world just before P!zer’s blockbuster drug Lipitor, which reduces LDL cholesterol, was brought 
to market. When Lipitor was not yet available it did not create a consumers’ surplus, and consumers used 
whatever cholesterol-reducing products and activities that the market o"ered. #e drug was then introduced 
at a very high price. Consumers were not injured by this transition, however, whether or not the price was 
set at monopoly levels. People who did not buy Lipitor were una"ected. Not only were the earlier alternatives 
still available, they may even have become cheaper by virtue of Lipitor’s competition. By contrast, those who 
did buy Lipitor obtained at least as much value as its price. #e fact that it is purchased at all entails that it is 
producing consumer wealth. Total output of cholesterol reducing formulations has gone up rather than down. 
To be sure, Lipitor might not be creating as much consumer wealth as it would if it were competitively priced, 
but it is clearly creating more consumer wealth than a market without Lipitor or its equivalent. #e relevant 
comparison is not between competitively and monopoly priced Lipitor, but between monopoly-priced Lipitor 
and a market with no Lipitor at all.
A subset of patents operates di"erently in that the patents actually remove older consumer choices from the 
market. For example, a cost reducing process patent might give its owner so large an advantage over rivals that it 
is able to drive them out of business. Further, because consumers don’t get to select the process, the older process 
might be unavailable as an alternative. Even here, however, the patentee would not be able to charge more for 
the product than it did before its new process was developed, because the older technology is still pro!table at 
the pre-invention price. For example, suppose that under the older technology widgets could be produced for 
$5 each. #e patentee invents a technology that enables production of equally good widgets at $4. As long as 
the patentee held its output price under $5 it would be in a position to drive out rivals using the old technol-
ogy. However, if it attempted to use its newly acquired monopoly position to set a price higher than $5, the old 
technology would remain pro!table. Consumers would not be worse o", and they could be much better o".
#e all-important “welfare” question for legal policy is the role of the patent system in getting socially 
bene!cial products and processes developed. Consumer harm does result when the intellectual property system 
provides more exclusionary power than is necessary to develop some new thing, or when it excludes without 
providing anything new at all. For example, if a 10-year patent rather than the actual twenty year patent was 
all that was needed to motivate the development of Lipitor, then the additional patent coverage is both a wealth 
transfer from consumers and a deadweight loss.
Consumer harm also results when the patent system permits a !rm to obtain exclusive rights on something 
that is either publicly available or that soon would be in the ordinary course of events. #at is hardly the case 
with Lipitor, a drug that was in very high demand after it was introduced, and that led to robust generic com-
petition when the Lipitor patent expired late in 2011. In general, pharmaceutical patents on active ingredients 
are among the most robust patents in the system, and patent coverage is warranted for the soundest of reasons: 
development costs are high but copying costs are typically low. By contrast, “evergreened” extension patents 
on drugs, which are typically on new dosages or delivery mechanisms rather than the active ingredient, have a 
signi!cantly higher failure rate and, when granted, can harm consumers by extending patent exclusivity periods.14
Patents are sometimes granted on ideas that do not meet patent law’s requirement of nonobvious subject 
matter. #ese ideas would soon have been developed, or in some cases they have already been developed in areas 
that are not readily searchable. Certain industries, such as information technologies, or certain types of patents, 
such as software and business method patents, are particularly prone to such abuses. “Obvious” patents harm 
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consumers by creating exclusive rights in things that would otherwise sell competitively. !e deadweight loss 
of obvious patents is high. As the previous discussion suggests, it tends to be higher in markets that are already 
noncompetitive to begin with, because marginal consumers in those markets have more consumers’ surplus to 
lose. Many pharmaceutical extension patents very likely fall into this category.
!e deadweight loss caused by obvious patents results partly from an overly generous patent-granting process. 
But we would have to put far more resources into patent examination and prosecution than we currently do in 
order to catch most problems e"ectively.15 One thing that Congress could and should change is the statutory 
presumption of validity. !e presumption is something of an oddball. Most presumptions are recognized be-
cause the association of two things is highly probable. For example, a letter that has been mailed is presumed 
to have been delivered, because nearly all are.16 In that case it makes sense to assign the burden of proof to the 
person with the least plausible claim. But litigated patents are found to be invalid anywhere from one-third to 
one-half of the time, even under the current presumption.17  Given that, the patentee should have the burden of 
proving its validity case, just as it must prove infringement and damages.18 Nevertheless, Congress is unlikely 
to change the statutory presumption, and in 2011 the Supreme Court re-a#rmed that it can be defeated only 
by clear and convincing evidence.19
More generally, the problem of socially harmful 
patents lies with a statutory drafting process in both 
patent and copyright law that has persistently placed 
producers in charge, paying little attention to consumer 
interests. !at was true of the 1952 Patent Act, and 
even truer of the 1976 Copyright Act.20 More recently the America Invents Act began as a series of high minded 
and excellent ideas but the drafting was quickly taken over by a veritable war among various producer groups. 
Consumer interests were largely ignored.21
Permitting producers to control the law making process is sad because in this particular case consumers 
have the right set of incentives to produce optimal innovation policy. By and large consumer interests favor low 
prices, high output, high quality, and cost justi$ed improvements.
Producer interests are much less aligned with the public interest, although their situation is far more com-
plex. First, producers generally favor high margins on their own output, although they also want lower prices 
on inputs that they purchase from others. Second, to the extent producers are owners of intellectual property 
rights and pro$t either by excluding or licensing, they tend to regard more as better. !ey want longer terms 
and broader scope. By contrast, if they appear on the market as both owners (licensors) and licensees, their 
interests become more complex. If technology is fast moving and has a fairly short commercial life, as it is 
in many information technologies, then $rst mover advantages are more signi$cant protectors of innovation 
returns. Patenting may be little more than a socially costly nuisance. In general, producers want their own 
patent portfolios to be as valuable as possible and those of rivals or others in a position to license to them to 
have as little value as possible. In many patent-rich environments $rms that do a great deal of patenting pro$t 
from ambiguity and indeterminacy in the system. !is hotchpot of producer interests is hardly calculated to 
produce an optimal system.
To be sure, some producers are aligned more closely with consumers. !ese tend to be $rms that do not do a 
…LITIGATED PATENTS ARE FOUND 
TO BE INVALID ANYWHERE FROM 
ONE%THIRD TO ONE%HALF OF 
THE TIME, EVEN UNDER THE 
CURRENT PRESUMPTION.17
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great deal of protectable innovation themselves but who purchase their IP-protected inputs from other suppliers, 
and whose own IP portfolios are minimal—typically some trademarks and perhaps a few copyrights or trade 
secrets. A great deal of small business falls into this category, particularly retailing, as well as a fair amount of 
traditional manufacturing in commodity industries. But these groups have not been well represented in the 
patent legislation process either.
One well-known example of excessive producer orientation is the ever increasing length of copyright pro-
tection, even as the commercial shelf life of most copyrighted products is becoming shorter. If the incentive 
to produce requires a measured period of protection during a copyrighted product’s commercial life, it follows 
that no protection should be required once the commercial life has come to an end. In fact, the vast majority of 
copyrighted works being produced today have a commercial life that falls far, far short of the century or so of 
protection that the Copyright Act o!ers.22 Indeed, for 
a signi"cant portion of copyrighted works, the statute 
does precisely the opposite of what it should be doing: it 
has made the works virtually unavailable. For example, 
out-of-print books published in 1923 or later may still 
be under copyright, but a researcher can obtain them 
only by going to a library or a used bookstore, which 
may or may not have them. #e same thing is often true 
for journal articles, software, and at least a fair amount 
of music, photography and video content. Authors and 
assignees are getting either no or trivial royalties on 
these out-of-print works, but the public is not getting 
access to them either. One solution for this problem is 
a copyright act that is more aligned with our empiri-
cal knowledge about the changing value of copyright 
works over time. For example, a statute that o!ered a 
short period of protection accompanied by a moderately costly right of periodic renewal would serve to keep 
things under protection as long as the copyright holder reasonably expected a positive commercial return.23
Unfortunately, the consumer interests that are best aligned with optimal innovation are also the interests 
that have the smallest amount of involvement in the IP systems themselves. In the copyright system consumers 
can be sued, although most of the lawsuits are limited to illegal downloading and pirating. Even in copyright, 
however, producers have largely controlled legislative processes. Patent infringement lawsuits against consum-
ers are infrequent, and as a result the patent process is largely hidden from them. Most patent activity, even in 
patent-rich environments such as cell phones or computers, occurs upstream in the distribution chain. Excessive 
patent coverage or litigation costs are certainly re$ected in higher consumer prices, but to most consumers the 
cause is invisible.
 Quite naturally, when Congress seeks advice on how to improve patenting it goes to those who have the 
experience and expertise. #is is a common occurrence and explains a great deal of regulatory capture. For 
example, those who generate electricity and must procure the technologies, build the networks, and determine 
the fuels know a great deal more about power generation than someone whose principal experience is turning 
on a light switch. For legislative or regulatory bodies to go to producers rather than consumers for regulatory 
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advice is hardly an irrational thing. But this makes the regulatory capture phenomenon much more funda-
mental to regulation than many people realize. Patent law is particularly prone to this. Not only is the law old, 
idiosyncratic, complex, and technical, but consumers are hardly involved in the process at all except indirectly 
as purchasers or users of patented technology. It is only natural for a legislative body or agency to go to those 
with the experience.
One important step toward greater consumer orientation would be development of a “political economy” 
of the patenting process, aligning patent doctrine more closely with economic or innovation e!ects. Here, 
antitrust has a distinct institutional advantage over patent law. "rough decades of study, antitrust enforcers 
have developed empirically-supported models pre-
dicting how practices such as mergers a!ect pricing 
and output, the links between industry structure and 
propensity to collude, the values and costs of vertical 
integration and contract practices, and the like. One 
should not push the point too far, because empirical 
study has hardly eliminated controversy. Nevertheless, 
at a fundamental level, antitrust policy making today 
has an empirical content that is rooted in economic 
theory about how markets work.
Notwithstanding its strong identi#cation with new-
ness and innovation, patent law is in fact built on an 
ancient appropriation model borrowed from the law of 
property, particularly land titles, in which the economic 
e!ects of particular technical rules were seldom made 
explicit. In this sense patent law resembles property law 
before the rise of cost-bene#t analysis approaches to 
public land use policy and environmental law. While 
economic studies of innovation are manifold and have 
produced a rich literature relating innovation rates to 
such things as market structure,24 we know surpris-
ingly little about the e!ects of speci#c patent doctrines. 
As a result, patent law does a much poorer job of “metering” innovation than antitrust law does of metering 
competition, de#ciencies notwithstanding.
One example of this is patent law’s nonobvious requirement, which di!ers from the novelty requirement 
and is much more di$cult to apply. Novelty fails when something in the prior art reveals that the thing for 
which the patent is claimed already exists, a backward looking question asking whether something in the prior 
art anticipates all of the elements of a patent claim.25  By contrast, non-obviousness, or “inventive step” in 
European law, considers whether a person skilled in this particular art would be likely to have come up with 
this idea on her own.26
Determining nonobvious subject matter requires going beyond what the prior art actually contains in order 
to assess whether someone of “ordinary” skill, and who is acquainted with the prior art in that #eld would be 
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likely to come up with the invention independently. In the patent granting process non-obviousness queries 
typically involve situations where there are multiple pieces of prior art but no single piece fully anticipates a 
particular patent claim; or where the invention is anticipated in a di!erent market, or “"eld of endeavor,” but 
not in the one where the patent is sought. In addition, the non-obviousness inquiry may involve considerations 
that do not show up in the patent prior art, such as acknowledged but unmet needs, or general experience and 
understanding in an industry.27 For example, evidence 
that others skilled in the art had tried to solve a prob-
lem but failed points toward nonobvious subject mat-
ter.28 Examiners may also rely on their own expertise 
in a "eld to intuit whether the claimed invention is 
nonobvious. #e Supreme Court has observed that in 
many "elds there may be “little discussion of obvious 
techniques or combinations, and it often may be the 
case that market demand, rather than scienti"c litera-
ture, will drive design trends.”29 #e Patent O$ce’s 
examination guidelines acknowledge that the printed 
prior art, both patent and non-patent, will not invariably answer every question.30
Neither the case law on nonobvious subject matter nor the patent examination guidelines suggest empiri-
cal studies of the extent to which accused infringers are copyists rather than independent inventors. Patent 
examiners have neither the time nor the resources to conduct such studies in determining whether to grant a 
particular patent. But the forward-looking question of ambiguity can never be addressed e!ectively by back-
ward looking inquiries revealing what the prior art contains. #e real thing we want to know is whether the 
inventor is contributing something that is worthy of an exclusive right because society was unlikely to get this 
particular invention through ordinary market processes.
Here, evidence about the extent of independent invention in di!erent areas could be very helpful. #e popular 
conception of a patent infringer may be the person who willfully copies someone else’s invention. In fact, the 
patent infringement case law reveals relatively few copyists. Only some 11 percent of complaints allege “will-
ful” infringement and only 30 percent allege that a defendant actually knew about the patent it was infringing. 
Further, only 2 percent percent of reported decisions include a fact "nding of actual copying.31 #is is all the 
more important because the Patent Act provides heightened damages for willful infringement.32 If patentees 
knew that alleged infringers had copied their patented technology they would have every motive to bring will-
ful infringement claims. Further, the copying numbers vary signi"cantly by industry, ranging from a high of 
20 percent in pharmaceuticals, where the value of copying is obvious, to very close to zero in biotechnology, 
semiconductors, electronics, and computers.33 #is suggests that in at least some markets numerous patents are 
being granted for technologies that were likely to be produced through ordinary competitive processes.
To be sure, distinguishing copying from independent invention is not necessarily easy. Someone who buys 
one unit of a patented product may be able to identify its patented technology without leaving much of a record. 
However, many patents relate to processes rather than products and are not readily discoverable. Many other 
patents are not practiced at all, and the only record of their existence is in the patent databases. An unpracticed 
patent is also creating no surplus: its only “value” is the limitation it places on others to develop and use the 
covered invention. As a result, granting enforcement of unused patents against independent discoverers of the 
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patent technology is perverse. It actually removes technologies from consumer availability, precisely the op-
posite of what the patent system should be contemplating. Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s eBay decision 
the lower courts have increasingly been limiting remedies on unpracticed patents to damages.34  But that is 
hardly a complete solution. Even when remedies on unpracticed patents are limited to damages, many patents 
have a litigation value in excess of their technological value, which may in fact be zero. As a result, large-scale 
litigation by patent aggregators is actually creating a market for bad patents.35 
We have never developed a strong empirical literature on rates of independent discovery and how it varies 
from one technology to another. !e “property” queries that the courts and examiners currently use are not well 
designed for determining the extent of independent invention. !e evidence would certainly be market speci"c. 
For example, in the pharmaceutical industry it is highly unlikely that a "rm would duplicate a patented mol-
ecule unless it had knowledge of the patent. By contrast, business method patents are routinely given on trivial 
changes in distribution that others often come up with on their own. Copying of minor advances is the way 
that competition works in many industries. !e real impact of excessive business method patenting is to create 
unwarranted product di#erentiation that reduces market output while providing little or nothing in return.
Closely related is the problem of patent notice. !e obligation to obtain information and the obligation 
to provide it are correlative. Optimizing requires that the obligation be given to the person who can act at the 
lowest cost. In general, the cost of providing notice is lower than the cost of searching.36 !us for example, 
the real property recording acts place the obligation to record on the landowner, who usually records once. 
Otherwise the prospective purchaser must do a lengthy and di$cult history in order to determine land owner-
ship. “Notice” in patent law requires two di#erent things. First, one must be able to discover relevant patents; 
second, one must be able to interpret them once discovered. !e problems are at least partially interrelated: if 
a patent is very di$cult to interpret it will also be di$cult to discover.
!e economics of notice suggest that patentees should have the primary duty to provide realistic and timely 
notice to likely infringers. Of course, issued patents are searchable public records. !at does not solve the prob-
lem, however, when an area of enterprise has thousands of patents that are cut very thin and notable for their 
ambiguity. In the context of standard setting the problem is beginning to be addressed through arrangements 
that require patentees who wish their patents to be declared standards essential to disclose them up front and 
promise to make them available on FRAND terms. Upon inspection, even standard-essential patents turn out 
frequently not to be worth much.37
Ambiguity undermines notice when a lengthy, costly interpretation of a patent is necessary before one can 
determine its coverage and the resulting expert opinions are frequently unreliable. Patent practice encourages 
ambiguity in many technologies by enabling drafters to have it both ways, particularly for subsequently developed 
technology. Ambiguity permits a broader construction if no objections are raised, but a narrower construction 
if the patent encounters problems on anticipation or non-obviousness grounds, or perhaps when the applicant 
cannot show that it was in “possession” of the invention as broadly construed, which is another way of saying 
that he did not have a complete conception of it. As Judge Plager wrote in a recent Federal Circuit decision:
Sometimes such ambiguity is the result of sloppy drafting, and sometimes it appears that claims 
are drafted with a degree of inde"niteness so as to leave room to later argue for a broad inter-
pretation designed to capture later-developed competition. !e problem is exacerbated when, 
 66 Competition Policy International
as here, there is a con!icting or indeterminate written description and prosecution history with 
regard to the claim terms at issue. Claim construction then becomes a game of crystal ball gaz-
ing, not resolved until this court’s gaze is announced.38
Judge Plager then proposed that patent claim construction follow the general common law rule that ambiguous 
claims should be construed against the drafter.39 "at rule might require some adjustment for patents that have 
already been issued, but applied prospectively it would 
lead to clearer and more searchable patents. Indeed, 
the common law’s one bite at the apple rule has always 
worked quite well for privately drafted documents of 
all sorts. Ambiguities are construed against the drafter 
and most of the time we do not permit adjustments 
after the fact. "at gives the drafter a strong incentive 
for clarity the #rst time around.
CONCLUSION
Giving recognition to consumer interests in intellectual 
property will require more than tweaking, although 
some tweaks could help. Further, because actually 
including consumers in the law making process may be impractical, consumer wishes may have to be inferred 
objectively from information about perceived value.40 In any event, rewriting IP law so as to serve consumers 
would require upending a good deal of history, producing a policy that is driven less by historical property rules 
and more by empirical economic study linking the bene#ts and costs of innovation to speci#c IP doctrines. "e 
courts can certainly do some of the work. For example, the 1970s revolution that moved antitrust law away 
from small business protectionism was very largely a creature of the courts.41 Mainly, however, reform would 
require a special e$ort by Congress to give properly identi#ed consumer interests or their e$ective surrogate a 
seat at the legislative drafting table.
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